In this paper, we describe a noncooperative n-person game in strategic form (or normal form) and introduce E-equilibrium point. We give mainly the characterization of such an &-equilibrium point by applying Ekeland's theorem. 'C 1991 Academic Press. Inc.
INTRODUCTION
Much of the earliest work about game theory was introduced and was investigated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [9] . Both individual stability and collective stability have been studied in practical game problems. In view of individual stability in noncooperative n-person games, the concept of equilibrium point was introduced by Nash [8] . The concept is an extended one of saddle point in two-person zero-sum games. Such the equilibrium points have been investigated by many authors.
In [l-2] , the Nash theorem for the existence of noncooperative equilibrium point is proved by means of the Ky Fan fixed point theorem and some selection theorems for fixed points [&7] . But, in order to prove the Nash theorem, we need to assume the stronger condition such that a strategy set for each player is compact. So, we want to weaken the compactness condition. In this paper, we describe a noncooperative n-person game in strategic form (or normal form) and.give a definition of s-equilibrium point. Excluding the compactness condition of the strategy set for each player, we shall study the characterization of s-equilibrium point in the n-person game. Then, Ekeland's theorem will play an important role [4-51. 413 This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we formulate a noncooperative n-person game and define &-equilibrium point. Section 3 is the main part of this paper. Associated with the results of [l], we give the characterization of &-equilibrium point in the game. Especially, using the results of Borwein [3] , we replace the compactness condition by the closedness condition in Theorem 3.8.
FORMULATION OF A NONCOOPERATIVE ~-PERSON GAME
We define a noncooperative n-person game by the following strategic form (N, X F), (2.1) where (i) N = (1, 2, . . . . n) is the set of n players.
(ii) X= fly=, X' c U = n;=, IL/', for each iE N, Xi is the subset of a Banach space U' and is called the strategy set of each player i.
(iii) F= (f', f2, . . . . f"): X+ R", is a multiloss operator and, for each i E N, fi : X + R, denotes a loss function for player i.
In this paper, denoting by i= N -i the coalition adverse to each player i, the multistrategy set, X= nr= 1 Xi is split as follows 'y=X'xX' and xi=flxj. i#z
If xi and ni denote the projection from X into X' and Xi, we set xi= nix and xi = xix for a multistrategy x = (xi, xi) E X. Now, we define, for each iE N,
and, throughout this paper, we assume that CC' > -00 for all i E N. In this case, the game is bounded below and cc = (IX', c?, . . . . CY") is called shadow minimum of the game. Then, we have If 0: = F(x) belongs to F(X), the multistrategy X E X attains to the minimum of the loss function fi for each player i. In this case, x is the best solution for each player. But, this situation is seldom the case and we have to investigate other solution concepts. So, we consider especially noncooperative equilibrium point. DEFINITION 2.1. A multistrategy x=(x', x2, . . . . x'l) E X is said to be a-equilibrium point if, for some E > 0 and all i E N, f'(x) B ,.j$;,=ytf'(y)+E. x E X = X1 x X2, e-equilibrium point is called s-saddle point in the two-person zero-sum game.
CHARACTERIZATION OF E-EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN THE ~-PERSON GAME
In order to show the characterization of s-equilibrium point in the game, we introduce the function cp: Xx X+ R, defined by
,=I THEOREM 3.1. Suppose that, for some E > 0 and a multistrategy .? E X, cp satisfies
Then, X is an E-equilibrium point.
Proof Let X = (Xl, X2, . . . . X") E X be the multistrategy satisfying (3.1).
We set y = (y', 2;). Then, we have rc'y = X' for all j# i and n'y = yi. It follows from (3.1) that
Therefore, we obtain .P(-f) 6 yth;,=xifi(Y)+&. (3.2) Thus, (3.2) is true for each in N, which proves the result.
Remark 3.1. We assume that, for each iE N, the strategy set Xi is a convex compact subset and the loss function fi is continuous and fi( ., xi) is convex for all X'E X! Then, using the Ky Fan theorem, we can show that there exists a multistrategy X E X satisfying (3.1) with E = 0. In this case, the multistrategy X is a Nash equilibrium point. IS called an e-subgradient of fi*( .; xi) at p. The set of all subgradients is called s-subdifferential of fi*( .; xi) at p E U'* and is denoted by 8,fi*(p; xi). Remark 3.2. The e-subdifferential 8,fi*(p; xi) is a point-to-set mapping from U'* into 2"'*' and it may be empty if fi* is not .s-subdifferentiable. If E = 0 in the definition, a,fi *(p ; xi) is said to be subdifferential of f'*( .; xi) at p. Since for all i E N, each loss function fi( ., Xi) is lower semi-continuous and convex, (3.6) shows that, for all iE N, E+ inf ye r/,i,rr'y=f' ficyi, xi)>fi**(xi; jjf) (f ' * * is the conjugate function off'*) = j"'(Z), which completes the proof. Now, in order to study the relations between s-equilibrium points and differentiability of the loss function for each player i, we at first give the following definition. Taking the inhmum of both sides of (3.11) over all ui~ U' with /(ui(/ = 1, we obtain -lIDifi(l', Xi)11 * >, -& Thus, the proof is completed. We can show the following theorem similar to [4, Proposition 121 when we do not assume loss function of each player, fi itself to be differentiable. THEOREM 3.6. Let a multistrategy X be Nash equilibrium point when X is closed and X E int X. Assume that, for every E > 0, there exists a lower semicontinuous and GBteaux-differentiable function ,f L( ., Xi) such that f;(y',x')<f'(y',x') for all y' E X', (3.14)
Then, for each i E N,
Proof. Since X is Nash equilibrium point on X, for each iE N, X' minimizes f i( ., Xi) on X'. So, it follows from (3.12) and (3.13) that f i(X) Q inf f i( y, Xi) + E.
.\.I c X' From Ekeland's theorem, it follows that there exists U: E Xi such that and uLEX' minimizes F,( ., Xi) =ff( ., Xi) + & 11~: -. I( on Xi. Now, fi(., 2') is differentiable at of and the function yi + 11~: -#(I, although not differentiable at uE, has a directional derivative in every direction. It follows easily that of have to satisfy the condition 0~D,f;(u~,?)+&B* (3.15)
with B* the unit ball of U'*. Letting E + 0, of: converges to X' and the left-hand side of (3.'15) converges to @(X) because of (3.14). This proves the result. lIz::*lI* <JE. (3.19) Further, 2, is a Nash equilibrium point of the game (N, X, F), where F= (f', p, . ..) f") . 1s a multiloss operator and, when the players choose x = (xl, x2, . ..) x") E X, f'(x) =f'(x', Xi) -(.Zf*, xi) denotes a loss for each player i.
Proof. Since X E X is an s-equilibrium point, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that, for each i E N, X'E a,f'*(o; ii). where the function G( ., xi) = gi( ., xi) + so that Z:,* satisfies the following condition 0 E a( g'($ *, Xi) + & h'(l; *, z')), (3.24) Using the subdifferential sum formula, (3.24) can be written as In order to show that K, is a Nash equilibrium point of the game (ZV, X, F);), from (3.25) we obtain Si*(Pi;Xi)-fi*(~~*;Xi)~ ($ pi-g*) for all piE Ui*, that is, for all pi E U'*,
-fi*(zz*; x')~(~~,Pi)-f'*(Pi;x')-(~~,~:E*). (3.27) Using the definition of the conjugate function to (3.27), it follows that -sup [(ad*,~')-f~(y',x')]3f'**(~~;x')-(~~,~~*). where M denotes a real number, but it may depend on Xi E Xi. Applying (3.18) and (3.19) to the above inequality, it follows that the loss f'(-g,) approximates fi(x) for suffkiently small E > 0. Consequently, the theorem says that if the game (IV, X, F) has an E-equilibrium point, there exists a perturbed game (IV, X, F) which has a Nash equilibrium point and the points of both these games are close to each other.
APPENDIX: EKELAND'S THEOREM Let (17, d) be a complete metric space, and f: U 4 R u ( + co ) a 1.~. function, f: +co, bounded from below. Let E > 0 be given, and a point u E U such that f(u)<inff+s. u
Then there exists some point II E U such that f(r) 6f( u), d(u, II) Q & and f(w)m4-Ja~, w) for all w E U.
